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right to discount future generations' utility?
Masayuki OtakiAbstract
Background: This paper examines a serious issue - whether future generations of utility should be discounted. The
issue is of vital importance because future generations will never have the opportunity to reveal their preference
regarding the current resource allocation and yet this will ultimately affect their utility. This paper addresses with
this issue in the context of the phenomenon of global warming that is crucially connected with the emission and
accumulation of CO2.
Results: The analysis focuses on how the social optimum is attained under the constraint of sustainability and
reveals the following relationship between the optimal policies: not discounting utility in social planning
corresponds to adopting the socially optimal carbon tax rate in a decentralized economy.
We also prove that the optimal carbon tax regime satisfies time consistency, indicating that policy is Pareto efficient
for every generation given the sustainability constraint. In addition, it is shown that the theory can be extended to
apply to an infinite horizon.
Finally, the second-best proportional carbon tax rates are calculated using available data. The result astonishingly
reveals that even if we apply a social discount rate of 5 per cent to annum in the planning economy, it is still
equivalent to levying 32 per cent proportional carbon tax rate.
Conclusions: Considering the actual absorption capacity of oceans concerning CO2, we can never be too prudent
in discounting the utility of future generations with regard global climate change. This fact indicates the need for
urgent introduction of a proportional carbon tax.
Keywords: Endogenous social discount rate, Proportional carbon tax, Ordinal utilitarian, Sustainability,
Time consistencyBackground
Evaluation of future generations' utility is a difficult issue,
as they cannot question their ancestors' behavior. In other
words, the economic activity of the current generation
affects voiceless future generations. The most prominent
example of such a problem is global warming which is in-
separable from the emission and accumulation of CO2.
There is a huge volume of research accumulation that
concerns the relationship between the concentration of
CO2 and global warming. Hulme (2009, Ch.2) concisely
reviews theory of the anthropogenic climate change thatCorrespondence: ohtaki@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp
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(1938) estimated that the global temperature would rise at
the rate of 0.3°C per century. On the other hand, Keeling's
measurements at the South Pole (from 1957) and Mt.
Mauna Loa (from 1958) revealed that the CO2 concentra-
tion was rising by 0.5 to 1.3 ppm per year at both sites.
According to Pearson (2000, p.385), there is evidence
that the CO2 concentration leads to the global warming.
Pearson and Pryor (1994) found that the CO2 concentra-
tion increases from 315ppm to 331ppm between 1958
and 1975, furthermore, their observations revealed that
concentrations would reach 358ppm by 1994. On the
other hand, the concentration during the preindustrial era
is estimated at 280ppm. The global average temperature
increased between 0.5-1.7°F. Ramanathan et al. (1985)n Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
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1.5-2.5°K from 1980 to 2030 (0.5-1.7°F). In addition,
Houghton et al. (1996) estimated that due to a discernible
human influence on the global climate, temperature will
increase by 1.1-3.3°K (2-6°F) over the next 100 years.
Uzawa (2003, pp.1-21) gives a precise survey of more spe-
cialized articles concerning global warming as it relates to
economic theory.
Much research within resource and environmental
economics discounts the utility of future generations a
priori. a However, no solid logical foundation is given for
the reason permitting such discounting. As such, the
main purpose of this article is to determine endogenously
the optimal discount rate incurred in the CO2 emission/
accumulation problem based on ordinal utility. We solve
the problem using the constraint of “sustainability” pro-
posed by Pezzey (1997) in a planning economy.
As Dasgupta (2008) summarizes, whether discounting
is permitted is can be attributed to the problem of “eth-
ics”. In this context, “ethics” indicates a method that
introduces additional, exogenous, and stronger axioms
concerning the comparison of utility streams. Koopmans
(1960) classifies the case in which discounting is permit-
ted. Diamond (1965) explains that no utility-discounting
leads to a contradiction when some assumptions are
imposed in addition to plausible standards of utility-
stream comparison. Both studies negate the possibility
of non-discounting.
On the other hand, Cowen (1992) and Blackorby et al.
(1995) assume cardinal utility, in which utilities are
comparable between individuals, and insist that dis-
counting is not permissible. However, the cardinality of
individual utility is quite a strong assumption regarding
the current welfare economics criterion.
Although arriving at opposite conclusions, such studies
have common characteristics. That is, in addition to the
usual assumptions concerning the utility function of each
generation, they all give exogenous and restrictive value
judgments in attaining their results.
This article is based on a solely ordinal utilitarian defi-
nition of sustainability proposed by Pezzey (1997). That is,
we call an economy sustainable when each generation j
can enjoy the minimal utility level U . b By using ordinal
utility, we entirely exclude any exogenous and transcendent
utility comparisons between generations. Such a broad
value judgment is not adopted in the preceding research.
This paper determines the optimal social discount rate
using the steps outlined below, while avoiding Dasgupta's
“ethical” problem. That is, while never imposing any add-
itional restrictions on individuals' ordinal utility function,
we arrive at the optimal discount rate using the following
two steps.
As the first-best benchmark case, we calculate the op-
timal tax that is proportional to emissions of CO2, basedon the given definition of sustainability. Since, for
simplicity, we assume that current generations are not
concerned with the utility of generations thereafter, and
only a part of CO2 emission is absorbed by oceans,
biomass, and etc., new emissions will accumulate in the
future. A proportional carbon tax is desirable because
the tax fully reflect the true price of CO2, and thus the
price mechanism use to deter excess emissions. In other
words, when a higher tax is incurred by the CO2 emis-
sions, individuals reduce their emissions, which conse-
quently reduce CO2 carried over to future generations.
Second, we solve the social planning problem to attain
the same utility level as that which occurs under the op-
timal proportional carbon tax (the first-best solution).
This procedure, also known as the method of Negishi
(1960), reveals the relation between the optimal carbon
tax rate in a market economy and the endogenously
determined social discount rate in a planning economy.
This gives the result that conventional discounting in
social planning cannot achieve the optimal taxation in a
market economy, if each generation has a right to enjoy
some fixed utility, utility should be equally weighed.c
It is noteworthy that utility discounting is compatible
with our ordinal utilitarian definition of sustainability. A
positive discount rate in the economy implies that every
generation prefers more consumption to the amenity
acquired from a reduction in CO2 emissions. As such,
even in the stationary state, the economy will not neces-
sarily reach the first-best resource allocation. Thus, the op-
timal social discount rate is not self-evident, even with the




We assume the dynamics of CO2 accumulation is as
follows:
et ¼ αet1 þ ct ; 0 < α < 1; ð1Þ
where et is the stock of CO2 measured by its weight, ct is
current consumption, and α denotes the proportion of
CO2 remaining per period. We further assume that a
unit production/consumption emits a unit weight CO2.
This assumption is permitted by defining the unit of
production/consumption volume so as to correspond to
the unit weight emission of CO2.
The economic meaning of equation (1) is as follows:
The sum of CO2 that remains within the atmosphere at
the end of period t consists of CO2 carried over from
the previous period, which was not absorbed by oceans,
forests, and etc., that is, αet−1, and the newly emitted
CO2 by generation t's economic activity, that is, ct. Note
that although the linear relationship in (1) seems to be
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linear feasible set as long as the set is strictly convex by
using the separation theorem of convex sets (see Figure 1).
Nevertheless, in such a case, it becomes necessary to have
information concerning the utility function to determine
the stationary state in which the highest utility is attained.
Another way to consider the difference equation (1) is
as follows: The current total CO2 stock et consists of
two parts. One is the accumulated stock of CO2 carried
over from the previous period αet−1. The other is the
flow emitted due to current-period consumption ct.
Thus, the dimension of equation (1) is the weight of
CO2 (giga-ton).
Takahashi et al. (1980) estimate that the portion of
remaining CO2, α is approximately 40% per annum al-
though this dissociation rate is very sensitive to the depth,
temperature, salinity, and alkalinity of oceans, etc..d
Individuals
Individuals live for one period. Their identical, strictly
concave, utility function Ut is as follows:




The individuals' feasibility constraint is
et ¼ αet1 þ 1þ θ½ ct  τt ; ð3Þ
where θ denotes the proportional carbon tax rate and τt
is a transfer from the government.Figure 1 Pareto Optimality and Carbon Tax.The meaning of (3) is as follows: Since θ additional
units of the consumption good are necessary due to the
carbon tax incurred, the effective price of the consump-
tion good/CO2 price becomes 1 + θ, as in the second
term of (3) (note that from (1), a unit of consumption is
assumed to emit a unit of CO2). On the other hand, the
transfer from the government reduces the production
and mitigates emissions. This is why τt has a negative
sign in the right-hand side of (3). It reduces to the differ-
ence equation (1) that represents the dynamic of CO2
accumulation, if we take the budget constraint of the
government.
Government
The government transfers the collected tax to indivi-
duals equally. e Namely, the budget constraint of the
government is as follows:
θct ¼ τt : ð4Þ
Market economy and social planning
In this section, we first solve for the optimal carbon tax
rate in a stationary market economy. Second, we consider
the optimal social planning regarding CO2 emission that
has the same effect as the optimal proportional carbon
tax. Based on these considerations, we answer the ques-
tion of whether the utility of future generations should be
discounted in a planning economy.
Optimal tax rate in a stationary market economy
In a market economy, each individual maximizes her/his
utility (2) subject to the feasibility constraint (3). Hence,







¼ 0; ∀t: ð5Þ
The dynamics of the market economy is fully
described by two difference equations: (1) and (5).
For simplicity, we assume that the economy is initially
located at some stationary state (c*, e*). Then, it is clear
from Figure 1 that the optimal tax rate θ* in the station-
ary state E* is α1α.
Optimal social planning and utility discounting
We now focus on the social planning problem under an
ordinal utilitarian-egalitarian definition of sustainability.
f Namely, we have the following.
Definition 1 An economy is sustainable iff
u ct ; etð Þ≥ U ; ∀t ð6Þ
holds for some given U .
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problem of the government as follows:
max
ct ;etf gTt¼0
u c0; e0ð Þ; s:t:e1 ¼ e; u ct ; etð Þ≥ U ∀t:
ð7Þ
The corresponding Lagrangean L is
L≡u e0  αe1; e0ð Þ þ
XT
t¼1
λt u et  αet1; etð Þ  U½ :
ð8Þ







 αλtþ1 ∂u∂ctþ1 ¼ 0: ð9Þ
Note that the constraints (6) always bind at the point
of the optimal plan (ct
*, et
*). That is,
u ct ; e

t
  ¼ U ; ∀t: ð10Þ
This property can easily be shown as follows: By the
Kuhn-Tucker theorem, the necessary-sufficient condi-
tion in a convex environment is to find the saddle point
of the Lagrangean, and thus
L c; e; λð Þ≤L c; e; λð Þ≤L c; e; λð Þ ð11Þ
holds. (c, e, λ) is the T + 1 dimensional vector of con-
sumption, CO2 emission, and the Lagrangean multiplier.
*indicates optimal values.
From the right-half of inequality (11),
λ λ½ ˙ u c; eð Þ  U½ ≥0; ∀λ≥0 ð12Þ
must hold. Here ˙ denotes the inner product. Since we
can select λ to be smaller than λ*, (10) must hold for in-
equality (12) to hold.g
An important property of the stationary state emerges
in (9). The stream of Lagrangean multipliers, {λt
*}t=1
T,




















where (c*, e*) is a stationary state of equation (1) and  ∂u∂e∂u
∂c
is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and the stock of CO2 in the stationary state.
Using the method of Negishi (1960), we can easily
prove that the maximization problem (8) with the initial
condition, e−1 = e







λt u et  αet1; etð Þ; e1 ¼ e:
ð14Þ
Thus, the endogenously determined Lagrangean multi-
pliers {λt
*}t≥0 correspond to the optimal social discount
rates.h
The first-order condition of (14) in the steady state is
∂SW
∂et







It is clear from (13) that such conditions are satisfied
due to the definition of {λt
*}t≥0.




< 1 ⇔ 1 α ¼ 1






Whenever the same allocation is also attained by a mar-
ket economy, (5) will hold. Consequently, the necessary





1þ θ ⇔ θ
 > θ; ð15Þ
where θ is the existing carbon tax rate. That is, the social
programming with discounting corresponds to lowering
the proportional tax to a level lower than that in the
market economy optimum. Such a steady state is illu-
strated by point ES in Figure 1. This implies that utility-
discounting social programming leads to excess emissions
of CO2, even from the ordinal utilitarian viewpoint. To
sum up, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1 As long as the economy is sustainable, the
weight of each generation's utility in the social welfare
function should be allotted equally in a planning eco-
nomy. Utility discounting corresponds to the carbon tax
rate being lower than the optimum in a market economy.
That is,
λt ≤1 ∀t ⇔ θ≤θ
 ¼ α
1 α
holds with equality only when λt
* = 1.
Sustainability and discounting
In this subsection, we deal with the relationship between
the sustainable utility Uj and utility discounting.
We have the following representation that is equiva-
lent to Theorem 1.
Figure 2 Time Consistency of the Optimal Planning.
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mized when the Lagrangean (8) evaluated at the optimal
solution is maximized on the feasible sustainable utility
level U .i
Proof.
According to Theorem 1, applying the optimal carbon
tax rate θ* to a market economy is equivalent to setting
the discount rate as zero in the social welfare function.
Hence, we can sufficiently prove the theorem by showing
that maximizing the Lagrangean evaluated at the optimal
solution concerning feasible sustainable utility level U is
equivalent to applying the optimal tax rate θ ¼ α1α.
The Lagrangean evaluated at the optimal solution L* is
L Uð Þ ¼ u ct Uð Þ; et Uð Þ
 
; ð16Þ
where * indicates optimal values. Since all constraints
are binding for the optimal solution, all terms of the
Lagrangean after the current period t vanish.















































¼ 11α in the stationary state.















The optimal solutions satisfy (5). Furthermore, it is




























Accordingly, L* is maximized on U when a market
economy adopts the optimal carbon tax rate θ*.
Since Theorem 2 implies that
U ¼ u c U ; e U  ; U≡ arg max
U
u c Uð Þ; e Uð Þð Þ;
ð19Þ
in principle, there is no conflict between generations
regarding the optimal carbon taxation. Equation (19)
indicates that the optimal social planning by the current
generation is also optimal from the viewpoint of future
generations. In this sense, the social planning is time
consistent, and hence, the utility level required for sus-
tainability is set at the most desired level (see Figure 1).j
Infinite horizon case
Finally, we discuss the case of an infinite time horizon
for the social planning. According to Theorem 1, equal
weighting is not constrained to unity. As such, we set 1T
as the weight and take the limit T→ +∞. Then, we have







u ct ; etð Þ: ð20Þ
Thus, the divergence problem for the sum of utility
can be avoided, even if the social discount rate is unity.
Dutta (1991), Broome (1992), and Cline (1992) apply this
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Our paper provides a microeconomic foundation for
their research, using Pareto efficiency and stationary
equilibrium as a basis.
Case Study: Second-best proportional carbon tax and the
social discount rate
In this section, as a case study, we calculate the relation-
ship between the second-best carbon tax rate in a mar-
ket economy and the corresponding social discount rate
in a planning economy.

















The left-hand side of (21) is the second-best social
discount rate SDR(θ), which corresponds to the car-
bon tax rate θ. We consider the length of one gener-
ation as approximately twenty years. Relying on
Takahashi et al. (1980), we assume that emitted CO2





0:4k ¼ 0:4 1 0:4
20½ 
1 0:4 ≈ :67:
Thus, we obtain Table 1.
This estimation is robust, as the calculation does not
use any information concerning the utility function. In
other words, any well-behaved utility function will obey
equation (21). In addition, although the portion
remaining α is probably underestimated, the tax rate
corresponding to the endogenously determined social
discount rate is never particularly low; hence, we should
never be optimistic about the problem of CO2
emissions.
Conclusions
This paper analyzed the theoretical relationship
between the social discount rate in a planning econ-
omy and the tax rate on CO2 emissions in a market
economy. If a social planner discounts the utility
of future generations, this corresponds to lowering
the carbon tax rate below the optimum level in a
market economy. Given the ordinal utilitarian view ofTable 1 The Social discount rate and the second-best
proportional carbon tax rate
SDR 1 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.95 (per annum)
λtþ1
λt
1 0.98 0.67 0.55 0.45 0.37 (per twenty years)
θ 200 191 122 58 43 32 (%)sustainability, it is desirable to pay the true price of
CO2, which is
αþ α2 þ⋯ ¼ α
1 α :
This implies that a planner should not discount the
utility of any generation in a centralized economy, and
that the optimal tax rate must be equal to the total por-
tion of CO2 remaining α1α in a decentralized economy.
Finally, we must note that some important issues are
not analyzed in this paper. First, as we concentrated on
the properties of the stationary state, we have neglected
the issues of the transition process. While such an analysis
is beyond the analytical procedure used here, it would be
worthwhile to try a numerical analysis or simulation to
investigate how the optimal discount (possibly premium)
rate varies through such adjustment periods.
Second, we have completely neglected the existence of
uncertainty. Specifically, it is natural to assume that
governments do not accumulate information reliable
enough to determine how the CO2 emissions and eco-
nomic activities correlate. This fact makes it very difficult
to formulate the agreement necessary to introduce a pro-
portional carbon tax. It also implies that governments
tend to underestimate the optimal discount rate. The
optimal decision under such uncertainty would be an
important topic for future research.
Methods
The tradeoff between consumption utility and the disutil-
ity from the climate change which is summarized by the
total stock of carbon dioxide is expressed by a utility func-
tion. Each generation enjoys consumption, but instead,
emits carbon dioxide, and thus the concentration of car-
bon dioxide occurs. We calculate the optimal proportional
carbon tax that prevents the excess emission by using only
the information concerning the feasibility condition be-
tween consumption and emission independent of the form
of utility function. The optimal social discount rates in a
planning economy are calculated as the rates by which the
economy can attain the same intergenerational resource
allocation as that in a market economy where the optimal
proportional carbon tax is adopted. We find such an en-
dogenously determined optimal discount rate is zero.
Endnotes
aFor example, see Dasgupta and Heal (1974), Hartwick
(1977), and Solow (1986). Weitzman (1998) finds that
the lowest discount rate should be applied to the far-
distant future. However, he does not clarify why future
projects per se should be discounted.
bWe use the term “ordinal utilitarian” in the following
sense. Ordinal utilitarian implies that an individual wel-
fare is measured only by their consumption and CO2
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change, and assumes that the comparison of utilities be-
tween different individuals is not feasible.
cWe never comment on whether a market economy or
a planning economy is preferable for preventing excess
emissions problem because both systems potentially give
the best outcome. Our main interest is in investigating
how the best outcome is attained by these alternative
systems.
dTakahashi et al. (1980) consider two cases: First, the
case that there is a homogenous 75m thick surface layer,
which is isolated from the underlying deep water. The
other case deals with a 4000m deep homogenous ocean.
The former case shows that about 40% of emitted CO2
remains in the air although in the latter case only 2% of
CO2 remains. Weiss (1974) deals with the issue of how
the solubility of CO2 varies with salinity.
As Tanaka (1993) discusses, there is a serious problem
of the ‘missing sink’ concerning the absorption of CO2.
According to Houghton et al. (1990), a discrepancy
exists in the emission/absorption of CO2 of the order of
1.6 ± 1.4 giga-ton. Since the emission from fossil fuel
combusting is more accurately estimated at 5.4 ± 0.5
giga-ton, such a discrepancy cannot be neglected. Gener-
ally, the current absorption ability of oceans is estimated
at 2.0 ± 0.8 giga-ton.
eNote that although individuals know the values of θ
and τ, they do not consider the government's budget
constraint relationship in their decision process. It never
contradicts their rational economic behavior.
fThis definition of sustainability is identical to that in
Pezzey (1997), although we do not regard there is
contradiction between sustainability and “optimality” as
Pezzey (1997) insists.
gThis concise proof is based on Uzawa's proof. For
more details, see Uzawa (1958).
hNegishi (1960) shows that the Pareto-efficient equilib-
rium in a market economy is equivalent to maximizing
as if considering an additive-separable social utility func-
tion in a planning economy wherein the weight of each
individual's utility is equal to his/her inverse of the mar-
ginal utility of income.
iNote that whenever we predetermine the optimal
social discount rate λ*, the minimum required utility
U t is determined to be consistent with the discount
rate.
jDasgupta and Heal (1974), Hartwick (1977), and
Solow (1986) define sustainability as maintaining a
constant consumption level over time. However, their
definition of sustainability has an ambiguous welfare
economics foundation. Arrow et al. (2003) define sus-
tainability as a utility integral that increases over
time. Besides the ambiguity in its welfare economics
foundation, this utility integral analysis may lack theability to deal with the conflict between generations
easily.
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